Quantum Information & Computation
Volume 25, Issue 5
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open access

Deterministic Quantum Key Distribution with Untrusted Relay and Finite Sources

Guo-Dong Kang, Li-Jun Zhang, Xiao-Lu Wu, Qing-Ping Zhou, Mao-Fa Fang

Author affiliations
  • Guo-Dong Kang1
  • Li-Jun Zhang2
  • Xiao-Lu Wu3
  • Qing-Ping Zhou3
  • Mao-Fa Fang4
  1. School of Computer Science and Engineering, Jishou University, Jishou, Hunan Province, China; School of Physics and Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Jishou University, Jishou, Hunan Province, China; Key Laboratory of Low Dimensional Quantum Structures and Quantum Control of Ministry of Education, College of Physics and Electronic Science, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, Hunan Province, China
  2. School of Computer Science and Engineering, Jishou University, Jishou, Hunan Province, China
  3. School of Computer Science and Engineering, Jishou University, Jishou, Hunan Province, China; School of Physics and Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Jishou University, Jishou, Hunan Province, China
  4. Key Laboratory of Low Dimensional Quantum Structures and Quantum Control of Ministry of Education, College of Physics and Electronic Science, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, Hunan Province, China

pp. 542-551 · 10.2478/qic-2025-0029

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Abstract

Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is proposed to close all loopholes of detection devices in QKD systems, and it holds the potential to double the limit transmission distance of those one-way QKD protocols. However, most MDI-QKD protocols are nondeterministic, which reduces the potential key rate by nearly half. In this paper, we propose a deterministic QKD protocol with an untrusted detection relay and finite sources, and based on the current technology of QKD devices, we derive the performance formula for it. The simulation results show that the performance of this protocol can exceed the MDI-QKD within the long limit transmission distance range, about 445km.
Open accessCC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Keywords

  • Deterministic Quantum Key Distribution
  • Untrusted Relay
  • Finite Sources

Suggested citation

Guo-Dong Kang, Li-Jun Zhang, Xiao-Lu Wu, Qing-Ping Zhou, Mao-Fa Fang (2025). Deterministic Quantum Key Distribution with Untrusted Relay and Finite Sources. Quantum Information & Computation, 25(5), 542-551. https://doi.org/10.2478/qic-2025-0029

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